Epistemology

Reflective equilibrium and epistemology of understanding

Traditional epistemology focuses on theories of knowledge that account for true beliefs and truth-conducive justification. This is too narrow a perspective since scientific and philosophical theories do not just aim at amassing true sentences. Rather, their goal is to advance our understanding of problems and phenomena. An epistemology that can explicate understanding in this sense must include further goals of inquiry (e.g. systematicity and coherence) and account for non-propositional contributions to understanding (e.g. illuminating examples, fruitful categories).

In this project we develop an epistemology based on the method of reflective equilibrium. This framework does not only dovetail with an epistemology of understanding. It is also of special interest in the context of policy-oriented research, as it provides an account of epistemic justification that evades the dogmatism of traditional foundationalism and the subjectivism of recently popular relativism. On this basis, we investigate how understanding is advanced by contributions that are not propositional (e.g. emotions, metaphors and examples), and we analyse the role of diverse cognitive values such as truth, reliability, precision, systematicity or usefulness for practical decisions. 

This is a collaboration with the Research Priority Program Ethics of the University of Zurich.

Contact: Christoph Baumberger, Georg Brun

Key publications

Brun, Georg. 20**. “Rival Logics, Disagreement and Reflective Equilibrium”. In Jäger, Christoph; Winfried Löffler (eds). Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Frankfurt a.M.: Ontos. (pdf)

Baumberger, Christoph 2011: „Understanding and its Relation to Knowledge“, in: Christoph Jäger; Winfried Löffler (Hg.): Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 16–18. (pdf)

Brun, Georg. 2009. “Wer hat ein Problem mit irrationalen Präferenzen? Entscheidungstheorie und Überlegungsgleichgewicht”. Studia Philosophica 68. 11–41. http://www.sagw.ch/dms/philosophie/publikationen/pdf/pdf/Studia_Philosophica_68_2009.pdf

Epistemology and emotions (completed)

In cognitive science and ethics, the emotions have been of central interest during the last decade. Some philosophers have argued that emotions can not only distort cognition but also motivate inquiry, determine relevance and provide access to facts, beliefs, norms and non-propositional aspects of knowledge. On this background, the project investigates possible roles emotions have been claimed to play in epistemology. While it is certainly not true that emotions invariably thwart our epistemic endeavours, it is less clear whether this calls for redesigning epistemology or just for more careful study of their contributions to knowledge. 

Contact: Georg Brun

Key publications

Brun, Georg; Ulvi Doguoglu; Dominique Kuenzle (eds). 2008. Epistemology and Emotions. Aldershot: Ashgate. (Guide to the essays) http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754661146