Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Science

Project Description

Criteria such as simplicity, scope and explanatory power are properties of theories, models or hypotheses. There has been a long debate on whether and how to distinguish these criteria –also called “theoretical virtues” or “cognitive values” – from social values. However, it is equally important to distinguish cognitive values from epistemic standards (in a narrow sense), such as empirical accuracy, robustness, and logical consistency, which are used to assess warrant for belief. It has been argued that evaluative use of cognitive values is justified in relation to epistemic values if these criteria are restricted to an instrumental role in assessing the performance of theories, models or hypotheses on epistemic standards. We argue for a further rationale: cognitive values articulate criteria for scientific understanding. By contrast, social values provide reasons for investigating into theories, models or hypotheses that meet epistemic and cognitive criteria. Cognitive criteria need to be specified and weighted in relation to the problem at hand. For instance, complexity, simple handling and high resolution may be required for model-based prediction of regional climate impacts, but not for explaining how the global climate system works. If their goodness depends on how criteria are specified and weighted for the problem at hand, then there is no theory, model or hypothesis that is good as such.

Contact

• Christoph Baumberger
• Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn

Key Publications

• Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude; Baumberger, Christoph. Forthcoming. What Types of Values Enter Simulation Validation and What are Their Roles? In: Claus Beisbart and Nicole J. Sam (eds), Computer Simulation Validation. Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Cham: Springer.
• Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude. 2018. On Rationales for Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Scientific Representations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. doi: 10.1007/s10838-018-9403-6.
• Baumberger, Christoph; Brun, Georg. 2017. Dimensions of Objectual Understanding (PDF, 114 KB). In: Stephen Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, and Sabine Ammon (eds), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge, 165-189.