Moral Understanding

Colloquium at GAP.8, University of Constance, September 20, 2012

The colloquium “Moral Understanding” explores whether and how recent debates about knowledge vs. understanding and about epistemic values can shed new light on issues in moral epistemology. In theoretical philosophy, several authors have suggested that understanding rather than propositional knowledge should be regarded as the central concept of epistemology since it captures better what we consider a cognitive achievement. On the one hand, some knowledge (e.g. trivial and irrelevant truths) neither constitutes a cognitive achievement nor contributes to understanding a phenomenon. On the other hand, certain cognitive achievements contribute to understanding without constituting knowledge. Idealizations and thought experiments play a crucial role for scientific and philosophical understanding although they involve false beliefs. Cognitive progress may also be made by developing fruitful categories, but categories are not beliefs. All this implies that we acknowledge a plurality of cognitive goals, whose relative significance also depends on pragmatic considerations. Consequently, striving for understanding is considerably more ambitious than acquiring knowledge. It also calls for grasping interconnections between items of knowledge and for the ability to use information (e.g. arguing within the framework of a theory, applying results to new situations and devising suitable (thought) experiments).

The colloquium is based on the assumption that moral theories too primarily aim at understanding rather than knowledge. Even though the cognitive significance of understanding for moral theories has been acknowledged occasionally, there have been hardly any detailed investigations into the consequences of focusing on moral understanding. First of all, there is the question of what understanding amounts to in the context of moral theories. More specific questions include: What is the object of moral understanding? Is moral understanding factive? What are the epistemic values moral theories should try to realize? Should pragmatic considerations (e.g. chances for reaching a consensus) shape epistemic goals of moral theories? Does moral understanding relate in a cognitively relevant way to abilities, such as raising relevant questions, developing illuminating thought experiments and appealing to appropriate examples?

Program

• Alison Hills: What is a Moral Expert?
  
• Geoffrey Sayre-McCord: Moral Know-How and Moral Understanding
  
• Gerhard Ernst: The Importance of Moral Understanding